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Abstract 
 
The majoritarian parliamentary electoral system of Canada has been in existence in the same 
form since the founding of the modern state in 1867. In this short paper I offer a defense of 
Majoritarianism when the alternative is some form of Proportional Representation. While the 
individual arguments I employ are well known, the train of reasoning here is, to my knowledge, 
unusual in the current Canadian context.  
 
These remarks were prepared as an opening statement for a debate on electoral reform at a 
Faculty of Public Affairs conference in honor of Carleton University's 75th anniversary, March 3, 
2017. The debate arose because of the Prime Minister's announced intention to replace the 
current  system with some other during the election campaign that led to his victory in 2015. The 
debate occurred several months after the release of a lengthy report on electoral reform by a 
special all-party committee of the House of Commons. A few weeks before the debate, the Prime 
Minister announced (independently of the debate, of course) that his government would no 
longer pursue electoral reform, perhaps because it looked like he would not be able to avoid a 
referendum, a process which is hard to control. In any event, and especially in the light of recent 
attempts to change the electoral system both at the federal level and in some provinces, I think 
it is important for people to understand why the existing electoral system is a sensible one that 
likely will continue to serve us reasonably well.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Few people have bothered to defend the Majoritarian, winner take all character of our current 
electoral system in which the party with the largest number of seats, each won with a plurality 
at the constituency level, is granted a franchise to govern by itself for a maximum term. I am 
going to explain why this system, which has worked reasonably well for 150 years, deserves to 
be maintained. This does not mean that I reject any kind of electoral reform. Nor must you do so 
in order to agree with the argument I will present. I am happy later to discuss matters such as 
specific voting rules for constituency elections including the Alternative Vote, campaign finance, 
the participation of public sector unions in electoral contests, general participation rates, fixed 
election terms, alternative mechanisms for election of the Canadian Senate, and so on. But these 
matters are not the critical issue we must confront. 
 
One defense of our Majoritarian system that has been offered over the past year, and that you 
may have heard or read about, is that our winner take all system makes it difficult for dangerous 
people or ideas to gain formal representation in the legislature when compared to the essential 
alternative, which is some form of Proportional Representation. This may be so, but it too is not 
the critical issue that we have to deal with. Nor do I think it is the most important matter when 
thinking about the maintenance of civil liberty, which depends on the countervailing system of 
institutions that constrain governments and other special interests from interfering too deeply 
in our private lives.1  
 
2. The main argument 
 
The critical and most difficult issue before us in this debate is how to deal with the leap of faith 
required in going from representative government, on the one hand, to good government, on the 
other. By good government, I mean a sustainable, democratic system that contributes 
substantially to our social and economic well-being. Whether we choose to err on the side of 
principles of responsibility if we stay with our existing Majoritarian system, or to err on the side 
of principles of representation if we adopt Proportional Representation in some form, we must 
make a well considered leap of faith in judging which system best promotes 'good' government 
in this sense. This leap is analogous to the one that was an essential ingredient in the 1988 
election fought between political parties opposing and promoting freer trade with the United 
States.  
 
How are these fundamentally different principles supposed to work in choosing a legislature? In 
the Proportional vision, an election is a means of obtaining a representative legislature that 
mirrors organized opinions in the country by assigning seats to parties more or less in proportion 
to their share of the national vote. 
 
 
                                                     
1 The argument below is augmented with some footnotes on specific issues, which were not generally part of the 
formal debate that took place. 
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The Majoritarian vision is radically different. An election is not a means of producing a 
representative legislature, though it may do so in an electoral equilibrium or outcome. It is in the 
first instance a means for voters to impose a government on a legislature, and to give the 
government the means to act decisively during the life of the legislature.2 Each government 
obtains and uses its franchise for a limited period, and then is re-evaluated to see if the franchise 
should be renewed or given to another party. This is what we mean by responsible government: 
a government able to act decisively and which can, as a result, be clearly held responsible for its 
actions.  
 
How do these principles actually work out? What is clear is the effect of either system on the 
equilibrium number of parties in Parliament, which is well short of what we want to know about 
how good government is best nurtured. The Majoritarian system we have now leads to a smaller 
number of parties, while Proportionality will lead to a larger number. Usually government under 
PR is a coalition of smaller parties that is produced after the general election, sometimes long 
after - it took 541 days to form a government in Belgium after the 2010 election - since one party 
will rarely have a majority of seats and the formation of the government will depend on 
negotiation among parties represented in the legislature.   
 
Note that unlike PR where the formation of government is handed over to the parties after the 
vote, under Majoritarianism voters are directly responsible for electing a government and, as a 
result, usually vote for national parties regardless of local candidate, which is part of its greater 
emphasis on accountability. The trade-off here - and every electoral system necessarily involves 
trade-offs - is that national votes and seats in Parliament are not proportional.3   
 
The most difficult part of the assessment we have to make concerns what happens after the 
legislature is chosen. Here we have to rely on arguments about how things evolve in the long run 
-- that is, about what public policies are adopted and about how these government actions affect 
our lives over many years. If you think that's hard to deal with, your right. If you think it doesn't 
matter, and we can make a choice between electoral systems without going into into such deep 
waters, I beg to differ. Maintaining a system of self-government that actually improves the way 
we and our children live is the central problem.  
                                                     
2 In a U.S. presidential system, a Majoritarian system, there are separate votes for the executive and for the 
legislature, while in the Westminster system, the two are effectively combined in one vote. 
3 The problem of  disproportionality raised in the text is also widely referred to by proponents of PR as the problem 
of 'false majorities'. It should be recognized, however, that this is a pejorative term that has meaning only of you 
start with principles of representation in mind. From the responsibility perspective, in the argument that follows, 
disproportionality is a virtue. On should also note that trade-offs are not confined to the votes-seats issue. See 
Myerson (1993) for a model allowing a comparison of 'corruption' in the electoral equilibrium of different electoral 
systems including the majoritarian and proportional forms. Electoral competition in a Majoritarian system may not 
always eliminate undesirable (corrupt or 'dangerous' ) parties or party leaders when compared to Proportionality, 
because it may be advantageous for voters to support a 'bad' candidate (who still would offer some value to the 
voter) that others also support than to vote for a 'better' leader who no one supports. This takes us back to the issue 
of civil liberty raised earlier, the maintenance of which requires that constraints be placed on the domain of politics. 
The need for such constraints is widely acknowledged, and the argument being made here is for Majoritarianism in 
a constitutional or liberal democracy as opposed to a system of unfettered majority (or plurality) rule.          
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Under PR, good government in this important sense is made subservient to balanced party 
representation in the legislature in the hope that in the long run, the two will be the same. In the 
Majoritarian vision, good government is made subservient to the election of a government that 
can act decisively and accountably over its term, with the hope that in the long run the two will  
be the same.4 
 
PR systems, by design, produce representation in the legislature in accordance with each party's 
percentage of votes. If a portrait of society in the legislature that reflects voting by party is what 
you want, regardless of how this works out in the end, there is no better alternative. But a  
judgement on this basis alone would be short-sighted. 
 
 2.1 Encouraging good government 
 
How can we go further? Consider this: In any democratic system, it is essential that parties face 
the prospect of losing office, that they do lose from time to time, and that they also face the 
prospect of returning to office. The prospect of losing office induces the parties to cater to all 
sorts of voters by never moving too far towards their own party's most preferred choices at the 
great expense of various minority interests. They do this because (risk averse) voters do not like 
to be jerked around (e.g. from left to right, and then vice versa) when partisan control changes. 
We all spend a lot of money to buy insurance against bad things happening for essentially the 
same reason. As a result, we see substantial continuity in major policies across adjacent 
governments. In other words, the prospect of alternation in office forces majorities to consider 
the interests of various minorities, even if they are not well organized, provided that the parties 
also see some prospect of returning to office if they are defeated.5 (Otherwise they have nothing 
to lose by pursuing their narrowest self-interest.)  
 
Herein lies an important reason for the Majoritarian, winner take all system to have a stronger 
claim to our attention. Because of the plurality rule at the local level, and because of the incentive 
that voters have to desert candidates and parties that are likely to be defeated, a small change 
in popular vote for a party can have large and even devastating consequences for the total 
number of seats the party wins, depending on how its total popular vote is distributed across 
electoral districts. Remember the Conservative incumbent government that dropped from 169 
to 2 seats for a seat share of 0.6% in the 1993 election, while their popular vote dropped from 
43% but only to 16%. In contrast, in a PR system, a small change in vote shares leads only to a 
small change in seat shares, allowing losing parties to remain in a governing coalition. 
  
Thus the disproportionality in votes and seats by party that proponents of PR often point to as a 
primary defect of the existing system is, from the Majoritarian point of view, an essential 
                                                     
4 This approach is inspired by Scott Gordon in "The Bank of Canada in a System of Responsible Government", 
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 27(1), 1961. 
5 See Adam Przeworski. Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government. Cambridge University Press, 2010: 144-145, 
and the references therein. 
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strength, helping to create and maintain the turnover that is a source of reasonably efficient and 
harmonious public policy.    
 
If I have time later6, I can show you that indexes of disproportionality peaked when Diefenbaker  
threw out the Liberals with a huge majority after more than 25 years in 1958, when Mulroney  
again soundly defeated the Liberals in 1984 after 20 years of Liberal governments, when the 
Liberals under Chretien destroyed the Conservative party for a decade in 1993, and when Harper 
won a clear majority of seats in 2011.  
 
2.2   Protection against bad government 
 
There is a second, related, and important advantage of the Majoritarian vision. While the 
Majoritarian system by its nature creates conditions conducive to turnover, neither electoral 
vision contains any absolute guarantee as to the goodness of the government that emerges over 
the longer run. How could they?  
 
The philosopher Karl Popper took up the question of what sort of system we ought to adopt in 
the absence of such a guarantee, and in view of the fundamental difficulty of agreeing on what 
'good' government means.7  He concluded that the best political system is one that is better at 
avoiding situations in which a really bad government does too much harm. From this point of 
view, we could say that the best electoral system is the one that allows a bad government to be 
replaced most easily.  
 
Which of the electoral systems we are considering is better in this sense? Without doubt, it is the 
Majoritarian one. Obviously we wont always or even usually agree on what 'bad' means in this 
context. But in choosing between systems, we can agree to build in a bias against renewing the 
franchise of a government about which a sizeable group of citizens is substantially displeased, 
rather than adopt a system that is more robust to such opposition.  
 
3. Concluding remarks 
 
Canada has had the same winner take all electoral parliamentary system since its founding in 
1867, and the country has developed into one of the better places on earth to live. This is not 
only because we are endowed with natural resources - there are several countries with similar 
endowments that are worse places to live. Of course these facts do not tell us what the 
counterfactual under PR would have been like; maybe Canada would have been heaven on earth. 
But if you want to proceed cautiously when important, hard to reverse decisions are involved, 
these facts are not irrelevant.  
 
Finally, I return to the main issue, which is conceptual as much as empirical. Choosing between 
proportional and majoritarian electoral systems requires us either to err on the side of principles 
                                                     
6 See the Appendix. 
7 See Karl Popper. "The open society and its enemies revisited". The Economist. April 23, 1988: 19-22. 
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of representation, or to err on the side of principles of responsibility. Both choices necessarily 
involve a leap of faith as to what system best promotes good government. PR produces a 
representative legislature by design, but that does not guarantee good government. 
Majoritarianism is a sensible a way of encouraging good government, and is also a sensible way 
of protecting ourselves against bad ones. In my view, there is no compelling reason to destroy 
our Majoritarian parliamentary system, which has the characteristics I have outlined and which, 
as a consequence, is likely to serve us reasonably well in the future.  
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Appendix. Votes, seats and proportionality in the post-WWII Canadian electoral system  
 
What follows is a brief introduction to indexes of proportionality in the Canadian context.  
 
The standard Gallagher (1991) index of proportionality of votes and seats is the following, where 
Vi refers to the national vote share of party i, while Si refers to its seat share in Parliament: 
 
 �1 2   ∑ (𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  −  𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 )2   . 
 
This index was actually discussed in Parliament during debates concerning electoral reform.  
 
In the following picture, Sir John A. Macdonald, Canada's first Prime Minister, contemplate   s the 
Loosemore-Hanby (1971) index of proportionality, which has a simpler form, but leads to a similar 
pattern of results for Canada:  
Taagepera and Grofman (2003) compare these and other indexes of proportionality from an 
axiomatic point of view, and conclude that they are both useful and better than others that have 
been proposed.  
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In the following diagram, based on work by undergraduate research student Meghan Byars, the 
two indexes are graphed for the 19th to the 42nd election, the post WWII period in Canada. The 
correspondence of substantial government turnovers to peaks in the indexes, referred to in the 
text, is clearly apparent.  
 
In the figure a 'C' refers to the Conservative party, and a 'L' refers to the Liberal party. A subscript 
'vs' refers to a vote share, and a subscript 'ss' refers to a seat share. The changes in shares referred 
to in the boxes are from the election prior to the one whose number is cited in the boxes. 
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